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ABSTRACT 
This article is concerned with the ultimate objectives of genetic biobanks set up to promote the 
public interest – being the sharing of samples and data for medical research - and the consequences 
for personal privacy of realising them. Our aim is to chart the values, interests and principles in 
play, to consider the challenges of realising biobanking objectives on a global scale, and to propose 
viable ways forward that ensure as far as possible that access provisions remain fit for purpose 
throughout the entire life of a biobank while adequately protecting the privacy interests at stake. It 
is argued that key features in any robust access model must include mechanisms (a) to maintain 
participant trust in management of the resource and to measure and respond to participants’ 
expectations, (b) to facilitate and promote the sharing of benefits, and (c) to respond timeously and 
effectively to challenges as and when they arise.        
 
ACCESSING BIOBANKS: THE VALUES AND INTERESTS AT STAKE 
 This paper is concerned with biobanks which are expressly set up to promote the public 
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interest and a paradigm example of this is the publicly-funded biobank in the health sector. In this 
context it is submitted that the objectives of such biobanks are, quite simply, to create resources of 
genetic material and information and to promote access by a range of as-yet unknown parties. 
Although specific purposes and users will vary across biobanks, the reality is that the continued 
existence of such genetic biobanks can only be justified if appropriate access is given; and threats 
and concerns about the privacy of the individuals whose samples and data constitute the particular 
resource come with all kinds of access. This article explores the tensions that can arise and offers 
ways forward for biobank governance and regulation focussing on the role of trust, participants’ 
expectations, benefit sharing and responsive governance mechanisms that develop and evolve with 
the resource itself.  
 This section describes the core values that we believe are at stake with the maintenance and 
exploitation of biobanks containing human genetic material and data. These are (a) privacy, (b) 
public interest(s), including the maximisation of the utility of genetic resource resources, and (c) 
solidarity, including the sharing of the benefits of these resources as widely as possible. We are not 
concerned here with the mechanisms necessary to recruit participants and to protect their interests 
when setting up a biobank, but rather our concern is with the interests that are in play once the 
resource exists and access to it is contemplated. This having been said, the core interest which is 
common to both the recruitment and the retention phases in biobank governance is that relating to 
guarantees of personal privacy protection and it is, therefore, fitting that we begin with an account 
of the nature of these interests. 
 
Privacy 
Human genetics and biobanks have taken some of the classic privacy concerns such as fear of 
misuse of personal information, stigmatisation of groups, and unjustified intrusion into private life, 
to new heights. The conceptual complexities of privacy are well recognised, and our involvement in 
the Privileged project1 has led us to believe that it is valuable to see privacy interests in four inter-
related dimensions: (i) physical privacy,(ii) informational privacy, (iii) decisional privacy and (iv) 
proprietary privacy.  Each dimension is very evident in laws and governance regimes in European 
states as well as in public understandings of the concept.2 Each dimension is also important when 
mapping the privacy concerns that biobanks pose. For example, the concern of physical privacy in 
relation to biobanks arises at the recruitment stage of the biobank; this relates to gathering and 
storing genetic samples and not tested them without consent. Once recruitment is completed then 
informational privacy becomes relevant with respect to the information and/or samples of 
individuals that make up the resource. The core concern is about the possibility of misuse of 
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information, not least the risk of discrimination, which we define here as treating different groups 
differently for illogical or irrational reasons. Decisional privacy highlights the interest that biobank 
participants have in control or influence over what is done with the resource - and by implication 
with their data and samples. Primarily, this involves processes of decision-making in relation to 
access to biobanks and control of governmental or third party use, and also includes the individual 
choice whether or not to remain a biobank participant. Finally, proprietary privacy concerns 
ownership of genetic samples and the control of identity as it relates to our genes. Even if it is not 
generally recognised that individuals own their genetic samples,3 proprietary-type claims might be 
invoked in response to concerns that arise from new technologies such as data-mining and profiling. 
These technological possibilities mean that different databases and data can be compared quickly 
and easily, creating new groups of people or profiles, and thus potentially giving way to new and 
unexpected possibilities of discrimination and stigma.4  
These dimensions of privacy are not discrete categories and often overlap. They may intersect 
with other concepts such as autonomy or liberty that are well recognised and protected values in 
western and other countries. At this level of abstraction, however, we can use this approach to 
understand and characterise meaningfully the kind of interests that are at stake. It is important to be 
able to do so because at a more specific level –e.g. that of the nation state– we often find that 
different legal devices are used in different countries to protect the same kind of privacy interest. 
For example, Portugal’s Law 12/2005 establishes a property right in biological material gathered 
for biobanking purposes and this right remains with the person from whom the material was taken. 
This, however, is a relatively rare instance of proprietary privacy being protected directly through a 
property claim. Most other countries attempt to give control to individuals through informational 
privacy or decisional privacy mechanisms. For example, all EEA countries have data protection 
laws that protect informational privacy interests and make consent the primary control device. 
Similarly, all Council of Europe countries protect the right to respect for private life and the 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised decisional privacy as an aspect of autonomy under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.5  
We must distinguish with precision the different problems arising from biobanking and the 
analysis and use of the data and samples that biobanks contain. As is evident from the Privileged 
project, the interpretation of privacy in constitutions, law and regulations within European countries 
reflect cultural differences. In some cases, for instance, access is permitted for commercial use and 
in others it is not, and in some cases citizens have an obligation to share biological information for 
medical research. With growing international collaboration between researchers, privacy concerns 
need to be sensitive to these different cultural issues. These cultural differences need to be 
4 
 
addressed but, we suggest, our framework provides a helpful basis for comparison. If we can better 
understand the types and range of privacy interests that are in play, and the particular legal devices 
that can be used to protect them, then we will have come a long way to addressing the problems 
themselves. The focus of this article is the privacy challenges thrown up by access to biobanks.  
Privacy and access 
The issue of access to biobanks touches upon all of the different dimensions of privacy outlined 
above. The central question is whether access necessarily and unjustifiably compromises privacy 
interests or whether it can be compatible with robust privacy protection. 
The right to privacy is often seen as empowerment or control of what is seen or sensed by others. 
This poses a problem for biobanks because once information has been handed over it has been 
shared to a degree and control will have been lost or certainly compromised. Moreover, onward 
sharing is an express aim of many biobanks that have been set up in the public interest; as such 
there is self-evidently a potential increase in risks to privacy. There are two main ways in which 
laws tend to protect against loss of control and/or harm caused by information sharing. The first of 
these is consent and the second is anonymisation. Each has value in the protection of privacy 
interests but also inherent limitations.   
Control is exercised through consent as the original terms of the consent set the parameters for 
future uses of the resource. Thus, consent will be breached if a downstream use is outside the 
purposes outlined when consent was given. The importance of this is recognised in the OECD 
Guidelines on Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases (Annotations), which state that: 
 
These Guidelines set out that the HBGRD should not grant access to or disclose participants’ human 
biological materials or data to third parties for non-research purposes, except when required by law. 
For example, the operators of the HBGRD should not make available participants’ human biological 
materials or data to third parties such as insurers, employers, law enforcement agencies or other 
civil-law agencies, for non-research purposes.6 
 
 If samples or information are to be collected with consent then it is assumed that control can be 
maintained by the provision, withholding or ultimate withdrawal of consent. However, the control 
that consent provides in the case of long-term projects such as biobanks is rather limited.  
Participants will typically agree to participate, refuse to do so, or withdraw once they have done so. 
It is an all-or-nothing affair with precious little room for negotiation or compromise. The exercise 
of decisional privacy must either be based on up-front trust of the biobank project at recruitment 
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(see further below) or it will be in response to downstream events, including breaches of privacy, 
when it may be too late to protect the core privacy interests at stake.  
A further limitation of consent is that it has little role to play in the security of information.7 This 
important informational privacy interest is most comprehensively protected through data protection 
laws, and it is important to note that consent to data processing is but one of a range of justification 
for data use.8 Put another way, consent alone does not absolve data controllers or processors of their 
legal obligations to process personal data lawfully and fairly, and this means keeping them secure. 
 Laws also tend to recognize anonymisation as a way to protect against the harm caused by data 
sharing. The rationale being that that if individuals are not identifiable, then their (informational) 
privacy interests are not in jeopardy.  While we might dispute this on the richer framework of 
privacy developed by the Privileged project, we cannot discuss the merits here. There is lengthy and 
on-going debate about different kinds of anonymisation techniques and what is ethically and legally 
required,9 but these do not concern us here either. Our concern is this:  to what extent does 
anonymisation offer the necessary security to privacy protection for participants while also 
furthering the objectives of biobanks to facilitate sharing and maximising benefits?  
Unlike consent, which is a reflection of an individual’s wishes and desires and a manifestation of 
the exercise of their autonomy (concerned primarily with decisional privacy), anonymisation is a 
technical measure achieved by technical means (involving mostly informational privacy). In the 
vast majority of cases, user access to medical research biobanks will only be offered on an 
anonymised, aggregated basis. Can anonymisation provide sufficient safeguards for participants and 
also provide researchers with sufficient material to conduct valuable research?  
This clearly invites further questions. What is a sufficient level of protection for participants and 
what is a sufficient level of access for researchers? There are advantages and disadvantages for both 
sides – if it is appropriate to talk of sides – in using irreversible anonymisation or reversible 
anonymisation.10 The former might be the most secure form of privacy protection for participants in 
that it is designed to make identification impossible, but it might not provide researchers with rich 
enough datasets; moreover, irreversible anonymisation removes the possibility of going back to 
participants with clinically relevant data, and the jury is out as to whether there are ethical and legal 
duties to do so.11 In most cases it has been considered appropriate to keep samples/data with some 
form of indirect identification to the donors (reversible anonymisation). The question then is 
whether we can still meaningfully about anonymous data when it is possible to identify the sample 
subject, albeit indirectly. Obligations under data protection law arise (and remain) whenever 
personal data relating to any identified or identifiable individual are being processed. Additionally, 
and more recently, it has been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights that data 
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protection extends to genetic sample collections as ‘personal data’.12 Thus, at least with respect to 
those who hold data/samples for the purposes of the biobank, reversible anonymisation will not 
avoid the rigours of regulation. It might be an entirely different matter when it comes to release of 
data/samples to users of the biobank who can receive information/materials that are suitably 
anonymised to absolve them of obligations under data protection law. Of course, whether this 
provides them with sufficient levels of information for research purposes is another matter; 
contracts and confidentiality clauses are the most common means used to control users in their 
handling of biobank data and samples. But to the extent that the goals of anonymisation and access 
might be irreconcilable in certain contexts, then trade-offs might be required. We return to this 
below but equally we need not see the options in a polarised fashion. 
 The value of privacy and the nature of privacy interests are often presented as individualistic 
concerns. Protection of individuals is self-evidently important, but to do so also serves wider social 
and collective –or public– interests. Indeed, the protection of privacy is itself in the public interest. 
Seen in this light, is it possible to reconcile individual privacy and public interests when it comes to 
managing access to biobanks? 
 
Public interest  
 It is often claimed that biobanks are set up to further the public interest, especially in the 
health sector and/or with public monies. Appeals to this amorphous concept are found throughout 
health law and practice, but the nature and scope of public interest remain illusory. What, for 
example, is in the public interest and what exactly constitutes public interest? Is it necessary to find 
out how many members of 'the public' must benefit from an action before it can be declared to be in 
the public interest? What is the degree to which the ends of individual members of society should 
be the ends of their society or be thwarted for those societal ends? And more specifically: what does 
it mean to maintain a biobank in the public interest when there are clear attendant privacy risks for 
participants? This last question has been raised already and brings us to the tension alluded to at the 
end of the last section. The concept of public interest enjoys an uneasy relationship with notions of 
privacy often because public interest is held out as a justification for interference with privacy or 
with private interests. But as we have suggested above, the appropriate protection of privacy 
interests is also, in itself, a public interest. The two are not, therefore, necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Still, a brief discussion of the essential nature of public interest claims helps to tease out 
the tensions and assists us in the search for options to resolves them. 
 Public interest may encompass contradicting attitudes. According to Häyry and Takala, for 
example, ‘[p]ublic interest is a diffuse matter, and respect for it can mean many things. Some of 
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which cannot always co-exist peacefully’.13  As we have identified, it is a public interest to protect 
individuals' rights to privacy and confidentiality.14 However, this public interest is not an absolute 
one and it is often met, ironically, with countervailing public interest claims that seek to limit it. 
Thus, there might be cases of public interest where it will be necessary to interfere with privacy in 
order to protect the general public, including identified or unidentified individuals or groups; as 
Powers has phrased it: ‘[a] commitment to privacy rights does not entail a commitment to absolute 
rights’.15 This conception of public interest is one concerned exclusively with the avoidance of 
harm to others, and Ashcroft has exemplified the possible contradictions by writing: ‘there is a 
public interest in the effective… administration of …. criminal justice; but there is also a public 
interest in restraining undue… surveillance of our personal lives’.16 In the biobank context, then, 
access by police cannot be ruled out, indeed it should be positively contemplated and 
communicated to participants as a possible risk to their privacy if participating in a biobank project. 
That said, this negative conception of public interest – that is, as a justification for interfering with 
personal interests to avoid harm to others – is hardly unique to biobanks. The police can, and do, 
access personal details in a range of sources and resources on a daily basis. The point, however, is 
that given the fundamental human right to respect for private life, the onus is always on those who 
would interfere with such a human right to demonstrate just cause; and in the European context17 
this must meet the exacting criteria of effectiveness, necessity and proportionality to which we 
return below. 
 There has been considerably less exploration in the literature of positive senses of public 
interest, that is, of the public interest as it relates to actions that promote socially beneficial ends 
rather than those which avoid socially harmful outcomes. It is precisely on such a conception – 
however vague it may be – that much of the argument in favour of the creation and maintenance of 
numerous biobanks rests. It is true, for example, that the benefits of biobanks might come back to 
individual participants - there could be downstream opportunities for feedback of health-relevant 
data - but this is not normally the primary purpose. Godard et al. noted in a study of four national 
genome projects (UK, Iceland, Canada and Estonia) that the Estonian project is ‘the only project 
that explicitly states that donors upon request will have access to their personal data and research 
results’.18 This remains broadly true today of such national population-based projects, and for this 
reason we do not purport to explore issues of individual feedback in this paper. Rather, our concern 
is with the prospect of the public benefits, which is advanced to justify such projects.19 Indeed, we 
offer the following proposition: scientifically sound, ethically robust research using biobanks is 
manifestly in the public interest. We would, in fact, go further and suggest that there is a positive 
moral obligation to promote the use of these research resources in ways that, in turn, promote the 
public interest. This can only happen through access. The imperative, then, is to promote access on 
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sound scientific, ethical and legal principles. But where does this leave privacy? And – to bring this 
to a central question – what precisely will it mean to promote access in the public interest? We offer 
some observations on the analysis thus far. 
 
Reconciling privacy and other public interests  
 On privacy, we would make a number of observations. We suggest that the guiding principles 
of necessity and proportionality can and should operate to temper access decisions in ways similar 
to the context of negative concepts of public interest discussed above. For example, access should 
not be granted to identifiable data if appropriately anonymised access can serve just as well. But it 
is also important to be aware that anonymity and robust privacy protection are more akin to crafts 
than strict science. No level of technical protection can offer an absolute guarantee of privacy and 
participants must understand this and be prepared to assume some level of risk. Finally, there will 
always be occasions for genuine and reasonable disagreement over access decisions that, for some, 
will fail to strike an appropriate balance between the protection of the (privacy) interests of 
participants and the promotion of the public interest in research. We need, therefore, mechanisms 
both to gauge participants’ expectations as to their privacy (and, indeed, as to what counts as 
research in the public interest) to feed into decision-making processes. We also require mechanisms 
to allow participants to voice their concerns about what might be happening to their data/materials 
and to their privacy; the most obvious example here is the right to withdraw at any time and for any 
reasons without consequence and in order to protect one’s information privacy; but for those who 
wish to remain involved and to exercise their decisional privacy other mechanisms must be devised.   
 On public interest, we suggest that our last point provides a valuable first piece of the puzzle: 
participants in a biobank could have a say in the use of the resource and could help to define and 
refine what it means to use it 'in the public interest'. This could include input on where to set a level 
of adequate privacy protection and/or where compromises on privacy might be reached. This is not 
to suggest that participants have a monopoly on what counts as the public interest; indeed, their own 
desire to protect individual privacy might stand in the way of wide-ranging uses of a resource. By 
the same token, it does not follow that a commitment to individual privacy is irreconcilable with the 
promotion of public interests. The value of including participants in helping to decide what 
constitutes a public interest use of the resource is a reflection of the shared commitment – between 
researchers and participants - to promote the biobank for precisely such uses. This is what people 
have signed up for in an act of social solidarity. We do not suggest that what counts as the public 
interest is the exclusive preserve of participants because this must be a matter for far wider debate 
and engagement.20 Notwithstanding such efforts, no amount of involvement will cover and answer 
all possible questions and issues, and at the same time be accepted by everyone. Still we suggest 
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that what should be taken from this section is that, broadly speaking, public interest should include 
acts or conduct which further society's better interests as well as providing adequate protection of 
the general public from harm. It is therefore arguable that public interest in the context of biobanks 
should include genetic research for the benefit of society as a part of public health and welfare, the 
promotion of wider collective interests where appropriate,21 and this may also include personal 
security and the fight against crime. More specifically, and because the value of the principle of 
solidarity in the context of biobanks is particularly strong,22 broad engagement with publics and 
participants should inform the process of deciding it means to manage a biobank ‘in the public 
interest’. 
 In dealing with delicate and borderline cases, or in cases where there might be tensions 
between competing conceptions of the public interest in access and the public interest in privacy 
protection, then the rule of proportionality should be applied in each individual case. Three tests are 
required in order to meet the rule of proportionality. The first is the test of effectiveness: the measure 
taken should constitute an effective means for the realisation of the aims or targets pursued by that 
measure. The second is the test of necessity and subsidiarity: the measure taken is necessary to 
achieve those aims and no alternative that is less intrusive is available. Finally, the third is the test 
of fair balance: there should be a fair balance between the aims pursued and the interests harmed. 23 
What is ‘fair’ falls to be determined as much by participants in biobank projects as by any legal or 
administrative body. Although it might be possible to draw some clear lines in the sand about that 
which is, by broad consensus, against the public interest – for example, any research intended to 
prove racial superiority or inferiority, ethnic origins or sexual preferences – the reality is that this 
will not assist us in the vast majority of access requests. Instead it leaves us to fall back on broad 
principle although this is not without a measure of evidence in its support: genetic research must go 
on for the benefit of society24 and privacy must be adequately protected. The drawing of the line in 
any given situation will obviously depend on a large number of variables, but some may carry more 
weight than others. Such variables might help tip the balance toward tighter privacy protection or, 
contingent upon beneficial outcomes, toward access. In the next section we explore one crucial 
variable that might serve this function and help to reconcile privacy and other public interests in 
biobanking access decisions. This is the phenomenon of benefit sharing.     
 
The role and value of benefit sharing 
 Benefit sharing has long been a recurrent theme in international debates about access to 
genetic resources. However, despite its prominence in law, medical ethics and political philosophy, 
the concept has never been satisfactorily defined. Attempts made in academic literature envisage a 
wide range of roles for benefit sharing. Most pertinently, perhaps, it has been characterised as an 
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‘action of giving a portion of advantages/profits derived from the use of human genetic resources to 
the resource providers in order to achieve justice in exchange with particular emphasis on the clear 
provision of benefits to those who may lack reasonable access to resulting products and services.’25 
So defined, benefit sharing can be cast in three different dimensions, i.e. as an act of sharing the 
resource and/or its outputs with: a) the individual research participant (and his/her family), b) third 
parties (ie, granting access), and/or c) the community/society/future generations. The main 
normative problem in this context, however, concerns the status of benefit sharing, i.e. whether and 
to what extent it should be a (legal) duty of the research institution managing the resources to share 
them with others. In a rare example, the new Norwegian Act on Medical and Health Research26 
recognises a legitimate interest for access by researchers to data and human biological materials and 
goes so far as to create a legal obligation to share biological material with researchers from outside 
the responsible institution. We submit that the basis for supporting such an obligation lies in the 
close connection between benefit sharing and the promotion of public interests. Notwithstanding 
any legal obligation to share, there is a sound case in principle and some evidence in practice to 
suggest that making benefit sharing a part of best practice can help resolve tensions between public 
interests in access and privacy protection.  
 A commitment to benefit sharing can be a powerful indicator of a commitment to conduct 
genetic research in the public interest.27 In fact, the connection between benefit sharing and public 
good is expressly recognised in various legal instruments. For example, Article 12(a) of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) states: ‘(a) Benefits from 
advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made available 
to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual.’ Article 15(1) of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 200528 provides some specific 
examples of the benefits that ‘should be shared with society as a whole and within the international 
community, in particular with developing countries.’ Such benefits include, inter alia, ’special and 
sustainable assistance to, and acknowledgement of, the persons and groups that have taken part in 
the research’. 
Most recently, we have the OECD Guidelines for Human Biobanks and Genetic Research 
Databases.29 In them we read:  
 
In recognition that the sharing of knowledge is one of the most important benefits to be derived from 
HBGRDs, they should endeavour to foster the exchange of information, technology and research. 
Information, technology and research may be carried through various means including through 
technology transfer, material transfer, licensing, joint development activities, etc. According to the 
Guidelines benefits resulting from the HBGRD activities and their applications should be shared as 
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much as possible among OECD and non-OECD states (with donors, communities, society as a 
whole).30  
 
And, as a precursor to all of this, we have Article 27(1) of the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights (1948): ‘Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits...’.31  
Each of these approaches, from the most general to the more specific, envisages benefits 
accruing to one or more of the three categories of actors we identify above, viz, research 
participants themselves, those who would access the research resource in the pursuit of new 
knowledge, and the wider society, whether present and future. Benefit sharing might, therefore, 
take different forms from simple data sharing among scientists of the research resource, to 
concrete financial or therapeutic benefits for participants, and beyond to the distribution of wider 
benefits in a social infrastructure. But as Sarah Wilson has observed: ‘with the increasing 
commercialization of ownership of the databases, the benefit sharing arrangements become 
seemingly more specific and more financially or materially oriented’.32 It is, however, an overly 
crude conceptualisation to limit benefit sharing to a partaking of eventual profits. Our own work 
in public engagement has generated evidence that suggests that participants in genetic research 
projects do not generally expect a financial return; they do, however, expect some wider sharing 
of benefits within the community – be these scientific, clinical and/or commercial.33   
The difficulty is that the practicalities of implementing these values rarely work. The 
Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization, adopted in 2002,34 is one of the most elaborated documents in the 
field of benefit sharing although it does not have binding force. The Guidelines have none the 
less been recognised as a useful first step in the implementation of relevant provisions of the 
Biodiversity Convention related to access to genetic resources and benefit sharing. The 
guidelines highlight the fact that: ‘mutually agreed terms could cover the conditions, obligations, 
procedures, types, timing, distribution and mechanisms of benefits to be shared. These will vary 
depending on what is regarded as fair and equitable in light of the circumstances.’ They provide 
detailed guidance for the implementation of benefit sharing arrangements and may be useful as a 
model to refine these arrangements in human population genetic research. But in many cases35 
the reason why benefit sharing models have not yet been in use is a simple technical difficulty: 
‘In the absence of royalties, profits and patents …it is difficult to apply the international principle 
of benefit sharing beyond the obligation to generate and widely disseminate new knowledge, and 
to return research results to the population databases.’ 36 
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Notwithstanding, the imperative to share has become all the more acute with the 
emergence of population-based genetic studies and the opportunity is very real to design these 
possibilities into new and emerging governance structures. The reasons to pursue a workable 
approach are manifold. For example, benefit sharing can create a sense of solidarity between the 
research community, participants and the public. As the National Bio-Ethics Committee of Italy 
has said:  
 
[T]he future outlook of biobanks – whether collections or tissue banks – is to grow in scale, from 
local to national, and from national to European, and these changes in scale might have an effect 
on ethical issues and on their elaboration, in the sense of directing them towards less 
individualism and a new sense of solidarity. More than in the rights of the individual, and within 
the respect of private life, biobanks could become tools in a new form of solidarity between 
groups and generations, based on a voluntary sharing of samples and information, for a common 
resource that must be available on a basis of rules of democratic participation.37 
 
Benefit sharing in this context can also serve to acknowledge the importance of on-going 
participation and support from the public in large-scale research projects from which, at least in the 
short term, there is little prospect of direct therapeutic benefits for the participants or the 
community.38 It provides a degree of reciprocity on which the trust relationship between 
participants and researcher is based.39 We have argued above that scientifically sound, ethically 
robust genetic research itself is in the public interests, and here we suggest that a clear commitment 
to benefit sharing must be a part of this. ‘Benefit’, however, should include not merely access to the 
results of research such as downstream therapeutic products, but also access to genetic resources 
themselves as necessary to realise those downstream benefits. It follows that widespread sharing of 
a biobank resource should be a given to maximise its utility and its service in the public interest. 
With this, however, will come attendant, possibly increased, risks to participant privacy.   
A recent example illustrates this well from the realm of open access; this is the phenomenon 
of encouraging sharing of scientific knowledge or resources with little or no expectation of return. 
While sound in principle, the privacy implications of such a policy remain unclear. A publication in 
2008 demonstrated that it was possible to identify individuals whose genomic data had been included 
in a cohort of anonymised genetic profiles made available to researchers over the internet.40 
Although this was only possible if the genetic profile of the individual in question was already 
known to those seeking to make the association, this revelation nonetheless led international 
organisations such as the Wellcome Trust and the US National Institutes of Health to shut down their 
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‘open’ systems of sharing data among researchers. 
 What should we make of this? Well, it implies that even if we accept that benefit sharing is an 
important aspect of a positive commitment to the public interests in genetic and genomic research, 
the practice of sharing – to include the practice of granting access to a genetic resource – will 
probably be accompanied by increased privacy risks. While it is clear that such risks must be 
minimised wherever possible, it is impossible to eliminate them completely; moreover, a de minimis 
approach to privacy risks might not be possible or desirable when considered against particular 
public interests in access and sharing. Then again, this might not be what is expected by participants 
who may be willing to trade-off elements of privacy in order to be a part of a project that is run 
determinedly in the public interest and in the governance of which they have a say. Matters are 
complicated by the fact that it is currently impossible to know what future access requests will look 
like or what privacy risks they will bring. Agreements about downstream benefit sharing are 
obviously even further removed. The task, then, is to devise governance systems that can meet the 
challenges as and when they arise. In the next section we offer some insights on the core challenges 
as we currently see them, before finally moving to propose ways forward to meet such challenges 
through governance arrangements.    
 
CHALLENGES OF ACCESS & SHARING IN THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
Trust 
The establishment and maintenance of trust in a biobank and its operation is arguably 
amongst the most fundamental challenge that we face. It is self-evident that participants must trust 
that their privacy interests will be adequately protected, although as we have suggested above, the 
realities of the risks must be fully understood and these will invariably change over time. Arguably, 
the most dangerous approach to take is to raise expectations too high with regard to privacy 
protection, for example, by suggesting that absolute anonymity can be guaranteed or by failing to 
alert participants to likely challenges to privacy protection over time.  
 Another feature of trust, which is often overlooked, is the trust of participants, the public and 
the research community that the research resource will be optimally managed to promote both the 
private and public interests at stake. Once again, this has implications for privacy in that trade offs 
might have to be negotiated and accepted if a full range of research ends are to be realised and a 
wide degree of benefit sharing is thought to be acceptable. For example, in order for biobanks 
situated around the globe to deliver their benefits, sharing of material and data will have to occur on 
an international scale. No one biobank, whatever its size, has the capacity to answer the wealth of 
research questions that will be generated. Only by pooling resources do we have a collective chance 
of arriving at meaningful answers. Thus international access is inevitable. Furthermore, if we accept 
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that international cooperation is the only route to success then there is a strong moral imperative 
that international sharing of benefits should also follow. This, however, might have a paradoxically 
negative effective on trust in biobanks. For example, a public attitudes survey that was recently 
commissioned with respect to the UK Biobank resource – which aims to recruit 500,000 
participants from around the United Kingdom and which will openly encourage international access 
– found significantly lower levels of confidence in international transfers of data or materials among 
the UK citizens who took part in the survey.41 What is not clear is what lies at the root of this level 
of concern or mistrust. Moreover, it might not be an answer –for participants at least– that the Data 
Protection Act 1998 does not allow international transfers of data to countries which do not enjoy 
equivalent levels of privacy protection. Eurobarometer (Data Protection: 2008) did report, however, 
that the highest levels of trust (82%) among European citizens lay with medical services and 
doctors.    
 A final point about trust brings all of these elements together. At the present time we simply 
do not know who will seek to access biobanks, nationally or internationally, for which purposes, 
ends or objectives. While it is true that projects that benefit from detailed governance arrangements 
have tried to set some parameters, inevitably these remain broadly defined. For example, UK 
Biobank states in its Ethics and Governance Framework that its purpose is to encourage ‘health-
related research’.42 But will this permit access for the creation of embryonic material through 
somatic-cell nuclear transfer?43 If it does, is this something that participants and publics would have 
contemplated or will tolerate? Challenges such as these will inevitable confront biobanks around the 
globe. It becomes a matter of trust, then, for all of us to know that such challenges are being 
appropriately met.  
 
Mapping and measuring expectations over time 
 It is a further challenge of large-scale population-based biobanks that they will not yield their 
benefits for a very long time. A common approach is to seek to build the research resource of 
genetic material and data and to follow participants over time until instances of disease emerge. The 
objective is to better understand gene/environment interactions comparing baseline date from 
recruitment with changes in health monitored through records and over time. But it will take many 
decades before statistically significant numbers of disease instances arise. For example, in a cohort 
of 500,000 it will take between 30-40 years before there are 10,000 instances of lung disease and 
around 25 years before there are equivalent instances of Parkinson’s disease.44 In the interim, 
attitudes towards privacy, the public interest, benefit sharing and medical research might change 
dramatically.45 Scientific and technical threats and opportunities will arise and the core governance 
challenge is how to devise a mechanism that remains fit for purpose over time while also mapping 
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and measuring public and participants’ expectations with respect to privacy and the uses of the 
resource more generally.  
 These realities of research and access have significant implications for our traditional 
approaches to research governance.46 The most obvious of these is the impact on the role of 
consent. Informed consent had become of primary important in recent years, for reasons that need 
no rehearsal here. We have suggested above that its limitations are revealed in the context of 
biobanks: how can a prospective participant be sufficiently informed about the range of uncertainty 
detailed above? The simple answer is that she cannot be. As a result, we cannot rely on informed 
consent as the ethical or legal basis upon which participation is legitimated. Rather, it is argued, 
participation is on the basis of broad consent to participate in the project with all that this entails. 
The attendant obligation on the part of the project researchers and managers is, however, to provide 
adequate information about the development and uses of the resources as and when these occur. It 
might even be argued that this is a more robust consent mechanism since it casts consent as an on-
going process and not a one-off event. Participants are at liberty to withdraw from biobanks that are 
set up on this basis at any time and for any reasons; but threats to their privacy may remain if 
samples or data have been distributed beyond their control or that of the biobankers. For those 
participants who remain, appropriate mechanisms must be devised that can adequately assess 
changing threats to privacy as well as applications to use biobanks resources casts under the broad 
rubric of public interest.           
 
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS AND BENEFITS FROM RESEARCH 
 Thus the position is this: we simply do not know what the privacy challenges will be nor, 
indeed, what benefits will emerge from biobanks. We have seen elsewhere47 that many countries 
use systems of ‘prior checking’ to authorise particular data flows, and we are all now very familiar 
with the role of research ethics committees in approving medical research projects. The problem 
with each of these processes is that they occur before the research is carried out, and – importantly 
with biobanks – long before access is granted. The personnel involved suffer (axiomatically) from a 
lack of informedness about the future; they too have to trust that the project will be managed 
appropriately. Arguably such faith is not enough, nor is the fact that legal sanctions already exist if 
breaches of privacy protection occur. This is too little, too late for participants and might well signal 
the demise of a biobank and the loss of important future public interests.  
 Furthermore, there is little sense in trying to second-guess the science or indeed the social 
sensitivities at some point in the future. Just as it is difficult, if not impossible, to define 
categorically what we mean by ‘privacy’ or ‘public interest’, so too will our notions change with 
circumstances and we need access mechanisms that can accommodate such changes. While we can 
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have an up-front commitment to the promotion and protection of privacy and the public interest, the 
specifics of how to ensure this elude us until the resources exist, access is considered and given, and 
benefits are realised. The easy cases – today – may be those where there is clear consensus on the 
privacy risks or the limited public benefits – such as access by insurers or research on race – but for 
the most part we cannot be and should not be categoric. This means a period of uncertainty for both 
participants and researchers and a raft of attendant obligations over time to keep participants on 
board and the genetic resources viable. One clear example is the on-going commitment to keep 
people informed; another, we would suggest, is provided by robust benefit sharing and this is borne 
out in part by empirical evidence. Privacy clearly remains a central concern but trade offs are, and 
will be, necessary and these will become increasingly important as potential benefits come closer to 
within our reach.   
 The objective is to devise governance mechanisms that take account of these uncertainties, 
that can respond to developments as and when they occur, that can ensure participants are informed 
on on-going basis, and that can also help to measure and manage expectations over time.    
 We suggest that a model such as that adopted by UK Biobank might be useful in meeting this 
challenge. This project is founded on a model of broad consent and trust. Participants agree ‘to 
participate in UK Biobank’ and the obligations of the researchers to participants are laid out in the 
Ethics and Governance Framework. It includes commitments to keep participants informed and to 
require some degree of benefit sharing from those who access the resource. Importantly, the entire 
project is overseen by an independent Ethics and Governance Council which monitors UK 
Biobank’s conformity with its Ethics and Governance Framework and which has the interests of 
participants as paramount in its objectives. It also advises on the use of the resource in the public 
interest, whatever that may turn out to be.48  
 The value of this approach, we would submit, is that it is designed to develop as the resource 
develops. It is primed to be responsive to new and as-yet unforeseen threats to privacy and 
participants’ interests and it has a specific aim to operate to promote the public interest. Its limits, 
however, are also considerable. The Council has no basis in law and has no formal sanction over 
UK Biobank. It is a creature of the funders not of the law. Furthermore, the commitment to benefit 
sharing is currently under-developed in the Framework and many have argued that far more should 
be expected of it.49 None the less, as a responsive and forward-looking mechanism it is a good start. 
 And what is the role of law in all of this? Whether or not a legal basis for biobanking should 
be established at the national or international level is a matter of considerable debate.50 In favour of 
legal intervention are factors such as legal certainty and the prospect of effective sanctions. Against 
is the need to avoid further regulatory burden and the fact that many governance mechanisms can 
work perfectly well without express legal provision. The UK Biobank is an example of this. It must 
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also be remembered that current data protection laws exist as much to facilitate responsible data 
sharing as to protect privacy.51 Beyond this, it is not obvious that matters of access should be 
further legally prescribed especially when the considerable benefits of access will only be realised 
through open international sharing. The watchword here must be flexibility, at least from the 
researcher perspective. The same is true – to some extent – when it comes to protecting 
participants’ and public interests because social mores necessarily change over time and law may 
ossify regulatory perspectives that become all-too-soon out-of-date. For these reasons we advocate 
a responsive model such as that typified by UK Biobank.52       
 We cannot possibly hope to answer all the questions about privacy and public interest that 
currently surround the development of biobanks. Indeed, it would be fruitless even to try. But, as 
we have suggested here, we can identify what is at stake within a broad conceptual framework of 
privacy even if we do not know what specific future threats will be. We propose that this framework 
and acceptance of future uncertainty allow us to begin to devise mechanisms that will provide 
answers over time. Only time itself will tell if they prove to be the right answers.         
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has argued that to maintain a biobank ‘in the public interest’ means to protect 
individuals’ rights to privacy and confidentiality, to promote access to the resource on sound 
scientific, ethical and legal principles, and to commit to benefit sharing. We conclude as follows: (a) 
international cooperation, which is imperative to obtain meaningful answers from large-scale 
(publicly-funded) biobanks in the health sector, will require global access to genetic resources in the 
future; but this does not necessarily mean that international legal intervention is required, (b) 
scientific developments and uncertainty regarding future uses of genetic resources challenge 
traditional protection mechanisms (such as ‘informed consent’ and ‘prior checking’), while attitudes 
towards privacy, the public interest and benefit sharing are fluid and contingent over time; 
accordingly, a responsive and flexible governance mechanism is needed to address these changes as 
and when they arise, (c) expectations about privacy must be realistic and monitored and managed 
carefully throughout the life of the biobank; the notion of public interest may be used both to 
consider access requests and to assess changing threats to privacy, (d) as no technical protection 
measures can offer absolute guarantees of privacy and much uncertainty surrounds what counts as 
research in the public interest, the relationship between participants and researchers is largely based 
on trust; nonetheless, participation in biobanking should be recognised as an act of social solidarity 
and a shared commitment to promote public interest research. This should entail a more interactive 
dynamic between participants and researchers than has occurred to date. Accordingly, our core 
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message is that governance systems for biobanks must be devised that can meet emerging challenges 
adequately and timeously while also mapping and measuring public and participants’ expectations 
with respect to privacy and the uses of the resource more generally. 
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